Can social influence be exploited to compromise security: An online
  experimental evaluation by Sarkar, Soumajyoti et al.
Can social influence be exploited to compromise
security: An online experimental evaluation
Soumajyoti Sarkar, Paulo Shakarian
Arizona State University, Tempe, USA
Email: {ssarka18, aleali1, shak}@asu.edu
Mika Armenta, Danielle Sanchez, Kiran Lakkaraju
Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico, USA
Email: {mlarmen, dnsanc, klakkar}@sandia.gov
Abstract—Social media has enabled users and organizations
to obtain information about technology usage like software
usage and even security feature usage. However, on the dark
side it has also allowed an adversary to potentially exploit
the users in a manner to either obtain information from them
or influence them towards decisions that might have malicious
settings or intents. While there have been substantial efforts into
understanding how social influence affects one’s likelihood to
adopt a security technology, especially its correlation with the
number of friends adopting the same technology, in this study we
investigate whether peer influence can dictate what users decide
over and above their own knowledge. To this end, we manipulate
social signal exposure in an online controlled experiment with
human participants to investigate whether social influence can
be harnessed in a negative way to steer users towards harmful
security choices. We analyze this through a controlled game
where each participant selects one option when presented with
six security technologies with differing utilities, with one choice
having the most utility. Over multiple rounds of the game, we
observe that social influence as a tool can be quite powerful
in manipulating a user’s decision towards adoption of security
technologies that are less efficient. However, what stands out more
in the process is that the manner in which a user receives social
signals from its peers decides the extent to which social influence
can be successful in changing a user’s behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social influence is key to technology adoption, and there
have been a lot of recent attention on understanding the
role of persuasion in security technology adoption [1], [2].
These studies have focused on various social influence factors
that impact a user’s decision when adopting several security
features. However, the question that has evaded the purview
of social influence for security adoption is its role in the era
of cyber-adversaries ans especially when their intents cam be
as malicious as attempts to hack into systems. Specifically,
social influence has always been studied from the perspective
of having a net positive impact on society [3], especially when
considering their utility in behavior diffusion.
However, the occurrence of strategic events in the past
in which cyber warriors exploit social media with malicious
intents has opened new avenues for reconsidering influence
as a tool for change. Consider the example of the experi-
ment where an American security firm created fake Face-
book accounts of a fictitious user in order to entice users
to befriend her and inappropriately share information [4].
In the course of the experiment, the study showed that the
role of transitive trust factored into influencing users to make
connections with her and in some cases even share sensitive
geo-location information, especially as users did not verify the
account. Specifically, some of the questions that emerged out
of such studies involved understanding whether users place
too much trust on friends and too little on their acquired
knowledge when adopting security technologies. And then
from the perspective of a cyber adversary, can social influence
be “successfully” leveraged for evil persuasion where users
could be tricked into adopting technologies that might be less
secure or could be used for hacking into their systems?
To this end, we conduct an online controlled experiment
with human participants with the goal of understanding the
impact of social influence on users when they decide to adopt
security technologies. Specifically, we modulate the number of
signals that users receive from their peers in the social network
and the pattern through which they receive them over time.
We analyze its effect through a game having multiple rounds.
In every round, each participant makes a decision to select
one security technology when presented with six choices with
differing utilities, with one technology having the most utility.
An example of such a pattern of peer influence in shown in
Figure 1. We investigate three main questions: (1) can users be
influenced to deviate from the optimal security technology in
presence of social signals, (2) does influence encourage users
to explore more options despite having the knowledge of the
optimal technology and (3) does the role of social influence
factor more than other aspects like exploration that are artifacts
of the experimental setup.
We observe from our experiments that while an early
exposure to higher social signals successfully influence users
to deviate from the optimal technology, it is not able to retain
the effect following the exploration period of the users. On
the contrary, a delayed exposure to higher quantity of social
signals influences individuals to deviate from the optimal
choice at the end of the game. Additionally, we find that
socially signals factor more than other cognitive aspects arising
inherently from the design, such as the number of options
explored by user so far or the number of alternating switches
made.
II. METHODS
We ran an online, controlled decision-making game hosted
by the Controlled Large Online Social Experimentation
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(CLOSE) platform and developed at Sandia National Lab-
oratories [10], in which participants took on the role of a
security officer at a bank. Participants were told that they
and several of their peers at different banks were being
asked to invest in a cyber-defense provider once a month
for 18 months or rounds1. All participants could view brief
descriptions of provider capabilities – e.g. one of them being
“Secure.com utilizes algorithmic computer threat detection to
keep systems safe. It prides itself on its efficiency and success
rate in warding against attacks.” Participants were able to
choose from 6 different providers - among which only one
was optimal, preventing 7 attacks. The remaining 5 providers
prevented 6 attacks each (from that perspective, all suboptimal
technologies had the same utility). This information about
the optimal and suboptimal providers is not available to the
participants in any group. An example of the screen is shown
in Appendix2. We separated participants into 5 groups based
on pattern of social signal exposure which will be described
in details in the Design subsection following this. For each
group, we controlled the number of signals (corresponding to
a suboptimal technology) that were sent to an individual from
their peers over each time step.
The entire game was partitioned into two phases. For the
first 12 rounds, no other information but a short excerpt about
the six potential providers was given. After the participants
made their selection for a given month, they saw the number
of attacks their provider had prevented in the corresponding
period. For every attack they prevented, participants received
$0.02. Thus, they were incentivized to avoid more attacks
and earn more money. However, since the participants have
to explore the technologies to first acquire the knowledge of
the technology utilities, the first 12 rounds allow for individual
decision making and exploration in the absence of any external
knowledge about the technologies or peers.
In the second phase of the experiment which started at
Round 13, we introduced social influence by allowing par-
ticipants to see their peers’ decisions after every round, and
by varying the pattern by which concentric decisions among
the peers were made over time. We attempt to avoid network
effects by using pre-programmed bots (these are the peers that
the users see in their screen) and holding the network structure
constant. All individuals in all groups have 6 neighbors whose
choices could be viewed by the corresponding individuals. An
example of the network structure is shown in Figure 1, where a
participant receives social signals from its six neighbors about
a random technology C among the 5 providers (barring the
provider with the optimal technology). For each subject, this
suboptimal technology C was selected as the peer choice that
would be disproportionately signaled by peers over time (this
pattern of influence would be manipulated by us). We call this
C the influence decision for the respective user. The motivation
behind this deliberate selection of suboptimal C as the peer
1We use Rounds/Months/Timesteps interchangeably but which refer to one
discrete unit of time in our study
2Due to space limitation Appendix is uploaded online: link
Fig. 1: Illustration of the linear cascade diffusion. The tech-
nology C chosen by us as the suboptimal technology for
influencing the user (in dots) cascades through the peers of the
user over the 6 time steps. Colored nodes denote the activated
peers w.r.t. C (manually preprogrammed by us) at each time
step. Note that although at Rounds starting at 13 and ending
at 18, there are subjects (uncolored) among peers who have
not adopted C, their decisions (technologies adopted which
may not be C) at those time steps are visible to the subject in
consideration (in dots). However, which users among the peers
have been preprogrammed manually is by default unknown to
the target subject.
choice (controlled by us) is to investigate whether participants
would be tempted to select the suboptimal choice.The knowl-
edge of the peers’ decisions allows a participant to rethink its
own choices made in the presence of utilities and we use this to
quantitatively measure the extent to which social influence is
at play. We describe the signal patterns and conditions unique
to each study in the following Design section.
For all the research questions we investigate, the outcomes
of interest are the decisions made by participants in the last
six rounds, in the presence of social signals from peers.
A. Participants
We recruited a total of 357 participants for this study to play
the same cyber-defense provider game. Participants were paid
$2 with the opportunity to earn up to $4.52 since as mentioned
before, they received a bonus of $0.02 for every attack they
prevented. Thus, the participants have a motivation to prevent
more attacks in order to earn more money.
B. Design
Participants were randomly assigned to five groups with
each group having unique members not involved in decision
making as part of other groups. Decisions in the first 12
rounds (first phase) are made without any peer signals and
are equal between groups. Let V (t) (t denotes a time step
or round among the last 6 rounds) denote the number of
peers of a user who at time t were programmed to select a
chosen suboptimal technology by us. For the last six rounds
participants in each group, except one group, receive signals
in the following mechanism which we denote as the patterns
of influence: (1) No Message (NM): V = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, (2)
Uniform Message (UM) : V = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, (3) Linear
Cascade (LC): V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, (4) Early Cascade (EC):
V = {4, 5, 6, 6, 6} and, (5) Delayed Cascade (DC): V = {1,
1, 1, 4, 5, 6}. (Figure ?? shows the signal patterns for the
groups):
Note that in all conditions, users can switch back to any
choice in the next round after having selected an option in
the current round. We consider the NM and UM groups as
our baseline groups and LC, EC, DC groups as our treatments
groups of interest. Note that while the pattern remains the
same, the suboptimal technology chosen by us for each subject
and that cascades through its peers is random. An example
of the Linear Cascade (LC) pattern is shown in Figure 1,
where the subject (marked in dots) is able to receive social
signals from its 6 neighbors. At Round 13 (start of the second
phase), a signaler (node v1) selects a suboptimal provider C,
and over the next five rounds, the remaining peers adopt the
same behavior one after another.(we will refer to this as the
influence decision). Note that although we program only a few
of the peers (bots) to adopt C over time, the subjects are able
to view all the bots and their decisions in their dashboard for
all the last 6 timesteps. We emphasize that all the peers of
the subjects are bots and do not share any topology between
themselves, thereby we sideline the effects of network on the
individual behavior changes.
III. ANALYSIS
Group # participants Average number of attacks prevented
NM 55 105.2
UM 71 106.28
LC 79 103.81
DC 81 104.8
EC 71 103.83
TABLE I: Average number of attacks prevented by subjects
in each group. The lower attacks suggest participants deviated
more from the optimal decision responding to social infleunce.
A. Distribution of attacks prevented
Table I shows the distribution of attacks prevented by
subjects in each group. We observe that, on average subjects
in the EC and LC groups prevent more attacks compared to
others. Based on a survey analysis, we found that none of the
traits like computer anxiety, computer confidence, computer
liking, intuition or neuroticism were correlated to the number
of attacks prevented in all groups.
RQ1. Will participants deviate from the optimal security
technology and move towards their peer suboptimal choice in
the presence of social signals?
Under this research question, we investigate two compo-
nents. First, we try to investigate whether the social signals
prompt the users to deviate from the best security technology
and move towards the suboptimal choice made by their peers
- to this end, we first measure the proportional of individuals
in the last step (Round 18) who do not opt for the optimal
decision and the proportion who settle on their respective
influence decision. The second component following this is
to now measure these two metrics for each subject in each
group at the time step (round) when the influence decision
programmed by us for a user is reflected in majority of the
peers of that user. That is to say, the first time step when 4
out of 6 peers adopt the influence decision (¿ 50% peers) -
this happens at round 13 for EC and at round 16 for LC and
DC groups.
At the last step (Round 18) NM UM LC DC EC
Proportional of individuals
not on optimal 45.61 30.55 48.10 49.41 43.83
Proportional of individuals
on influence decision 8.77 18.05 20.25 22.5 19.17
TABLE II
For the first component, Table II shows the proportion of
users in each group for the two metrics discussed above -
the results show that the DC group participants deviated most
from the optimal with 49.41% of users settling on suboptimal
choices in the last round. Among these, around 22.5% of
DC participants switched to their influence decision (which
is different for each participant) which is also the maximum
among all the groups. In fact while these results shed light on
the retention power of the influence patterns - while the DC
group’s power of retention could be attributed to late exposure
to larger quantity of peer signals, the EC group fails to retain
a lot of the users after the initial rounds.
First step where majority
peers reflect influence
decision
LC
(Round 16)
DC
(Round 16)
EC
(Round 13)
Proportional of individuals
not on optimal 46.83 54.11 57.49
Proportional of individuals
on influence decision 16.45 24.70 30.13
TABLE III
For the second component, Table III shows that on the
contrary, the EC pattern of influence is able to draw more
participants at the time step where the participant clearly
observes its influence decision as the one that majority of
its peers (geq4 out of 6) choose. This suggests that while
early subjugation to exposures demonstrates a better proxy
for social influence, the exploration time following this early
exposures motivates users to move away from this decision
and so we see a substantial drop in the values for the last
step for EC (compared to DC and LC) from table II.
RQ2. Does the presence of social signals influence users to
explore and revisit different options?
To further measure variations in decisions, we try to analyze
the effect of the pattern of influence on decision explorations
by users. The goal is to understand whether the introduction
of peer signals prompts users to explore more options even in
the presence of already acquired knowledge. Given a list of
decisions X made by each subject over the last 6 rounds, we
define entropy as H(X) = −∑ni=1 P (Xi) logb P (Xi) where
b is the base of the logarithm and n denotes the number of
possible decisions, which is 6 in our case. We use b = 6 to
normalize the entropy values to be between 0 and 1 – we
note that this is an artifact of the experiment design as there
Fig. 2: Entropy distributions for the second phase (Rounds 13
to 18).
are 6 decisions types. Intuitively, given decisions made by two
subjects, the participant with higher entropy value has changed
its decisions more frequently compared to a participant with
lower entropy value.
Fig. 2 shows the entropy of the decisions for the second
phase of the experiment. We performed the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) tests between pairwise distributions and we
found that with respect to the UM and NM participants
(control), the distributions showed statistically significant dif-
ferences with the LC, EC and DC participants (p < 0.05 for
all these pairwise tests) with respect to the options explored.
Particularly, we find that for the control groups NM and UM,
the entropy distributions peak near 0, which explains the fact
that users do not explore much under the control setup whereas
the peak for EC group is evident at around entropy of 0.3
suggesting that more users explore options in this group.
We conclude from this basic analysis that the introduction
of peer influence in the form of treatment patterns of influence
does indeed prompt users to explore more, but the more
subtle question here is whether the exploration differs among
the LC, EC and DC groups. To this end, we find that from
the same pairwise KS tests, there is no statistically significant
difference between these 3 groups when considered in pairs.
However, while most of these distributions are multi-modal
(having multiple peaks), the LC group tends to have more
users having higher entropy shown by the observation that
one of its modes lie near entropy value of 0.6.
RQ3. Does peer signals factor more than other cognitive
aspects that might impact users like the number of switches
made by the user so far?
We use Cox proportional hazards model, which is the
standard technique for assessing contagion in economics,
marketing, and sociology [9]. This tool measures the hazard or
likellihood of adoption of an individual at time t as a function
of individual characteristics and social influence: λ(t,Xti)
= λ0texp(Xtiβ) where λ represents the hazard of adoption
for a subject after the tth round (t ∈ Rounds[13, 18]), λ0t
represents the baseline hazard of adoption and Xti represents
the static set of covariates for subject i after round t - namely
the number of signals reflecting influence decision, the number
of decision switches made by the participant at t and the
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: The signal vs time step plots for the 4 patterns - note
that for the NM group (not shown here), no peer signal in the
form of pre-selected suboptimal technologies were sent to the
participants at any time step.
number of technology options (among the 6 possible) explored
by the participant at t.
Figure 3 displays the results for the DC and EC group
participants and it shows that when the 3 factors are considered
together for the hazard of adoption, the number of signals is
the only significant factor playing into the adoption of the
security features - the 95% CI lies above 1 (which denotes
significance) for both the DC and EC participants. However,
we find that none of the factors were significant for the LC
group participants - these together suggest that the pattern
of influence in the EC and DC groups were more effective
than the implicit aspects like the number of decisions the user
explored or the number of switches it made.
IV. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
The literature documents several experimental results on
the adoption of behaviors including network structure – such
as the study conducted in [5], [7] and decision making
[6], [8]. Under these study, it was observed that individual
adoption is much more likely when participants received social
reinforcement from multiple neighbors in the social network as
opposed to a single exposure. However as a major contribution,
they study the effect of network structure on the dynamics of
behavioral diffusion. Contrary to this, we quantify influence
using only the number of signals temporally sent to a user
irrespective of how the signals diffused to its neighbors prior
to its own adoption. Our focus here is on using social influence
as a strategic tool for exploitation.
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